To Pollute or Not To Pollute? Exploring MARPOL Efficiency in the Adriatic Sea

Authors

  • Ana Grdović Gnip University of Primorska, Faculty of Mathematics, Natural Sciences and Information Technologies, Koper, Slovenia https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4995-5046
  • Žiga Velkavrh University of Primorska, Andrej Marušič Institute, Koper, Slovenia

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.7225/toms.v11.n01.w13

Keywords:

Maritime transportation, Sea pollution, MARPOL, Paris MoU, Game theory

Abstract

This study explores the efficiency level of the current international regulatory framework (MARPOL) in preventing sea pollution during maritime transportation. We employ a game-theoretic approach that models the decisions of shipowners and countries, with respect to the treatment and disposal of waste, where shipowners' decisions are based on comprehensive estimations of all waste management costs for all categories of waste (i.e. all MARPOL Annexes) differentiated across six types of standard risk vessels, while countries' decisions are based on estimates of all societal costs of (im)proper ship waste management. We focus on the Adriatic Sea case study and evaluate the game separately for members and non-members of the Paris Memorandum of Understanding (Paris MoU). Our main results seem to indicate that shipowners are generally motivated to be environmentally friendly if sailing Paris MoU waters. Otherwise, shipowners are merely motivated to pollute, due to low inspection rates and expected fines.This study explores the efficiency level of the current international regulatory framework (MARPOL) in preventing sea pollution during maritime transportation. We employ a game-theoretic approach that models the decisions of shipowners and countries, with respect to the treatment and disposal of waste, where shipowners' decisions are based on comprehensive estimations of all waste management costs for all categories of waste (i.e. all MARPOL Annexes) differentiated across six types of standard risk vessels, while countries' decisions are based on estimates of all societal costs of (im)proper ship waste management. We focus on the Adriatic Sea case study and evaluate the game separately for members and non-members of the Paris Memorandum of Understanding (Paris MoU). Our main results seem to indicate that shipowners are generally motivated to be environmentally friendly if sailing Paris MoU waters. Otherwise, shipowners are merely motivated to pollute, due to low inspection rates and expected fines.

 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Ana Grdović Gnip acknowledges the support by Erasmus+ Jean Monnet Module 600616-EPP-1-2018-1-SI-EPPJMO-MODULE (EU Economic Trends).

Žiga Velakvrh gratefully acknowledges the support from the Slovenian Research Agency (research program P1-0285, research projects J1-9110, J1-9186 and J1-2451 and Young Researchers Grant).

Published

2022-04-20

How to Cite

Grdović Gnip, A. and Velkavrh, Žiga (2022) “To Pollute or Not To Pollute? Exploring MARPOL Efficiency in the Adriatic Sea”, Transactions on Maritime Science. Split, Croatia, 11(1), pp. 219–236. doi: 10.7225/toms.v11.n01.w13.

Issue

Section

Regular Paper
Bookmark and Share